We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any measure of constitutional harm. Id., at 154-155. Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. 633, 637 (1983). The General Assembly enacted a reapportionment plan that included one majority-black congressional district. The second type of unconstitutional practice is that which "affects the political strength of various groups," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. This Court's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness of Justice Whittaker's view. Pp. 1237, 1258 (1993). Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. income. electoral process. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. 3:92CV71-P (WDNC)). e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. In other words, the purposeful creation of a majority-minority district could have discriminatory effect if it is achieved by means of "packing"-i. e., overconcentration of minority voters. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. in M1 and M2? Consider that PC has a 35% tax rate. As for this latter category, we. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants' allegations are "not contradicted." Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). 2. No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute. of Cal. 3. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. (Assume there is no difference between the pretax and aftertax accounts payable cost.). Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. The Attorney General did not object to the General Assembly's revised plan. The dissenters thought the unusual. 339." SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. to Juris. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. 1. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." See ante, at 649. Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." See n. 7, supra. See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. See App. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. And, finally, if the answer to the second question is generally "No," should it be different when the favored group is defined by race? See Appendix, infra. 6-10 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" Draper identified on February 15 that a customer was not going to pay his receivable of $200 from December 9. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. 1973. or benefit provided to others.4 All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. As was the case in New York, a number of North Carolina's political subdivisions have interfered with black citizens' meaningful exercise of the franchise and are therefore subject to 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted" white voting strength. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). Const., Arndt. 408 (E.D.N.C. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. See supra, at 647-649. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Gomillion, supra, at 341. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). See, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Ed. In the Attorney General's view, the General Assembly could have created a second majorityminority district "to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area" by using boundary lines "no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan," but failed to do so for "pretextual reasons." -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Roe v. Wade (1973) Shaw v. Reno (1993) United States v. Lopez (1995) McDonald v. Chicago (2010) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) . 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 658. See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? To be sure, as the Court says, it would be logically possible to apply strict scrutiny to these cases (and to uphold those uses of race that are permissible), see ante, at 653-657. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which the live--think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. v. Bakke, supra, at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.). JUSTICE SOUTER apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group's voting strength. Media. What is the maximum temperature? I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. . 1300 (1966). Moreover, it seems clear to us that proof sometimes will not be difficult at all. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. It included all or portions of twenty-eight counties. ); id., at 180, and n. (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment).3. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. Ibid. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. 430 U. S., at 162-163 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.) Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. 1973). Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. post, at 684-685 (dissenting opinion). The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Two judges also concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the Attorney General's preclearance decisions, their claim was foreclosed by this Court's holding in Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491 (1977). Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(1977). 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that the second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. See Richmond v. J. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. by Wayne R. Arden and Jeffrey M. Wice; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. 376 U. S., at 66-67. Id., at 472-473. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. Washington v. Davis(1976). To date, we have held that only two types of state voting practices could give rise to a constitutional claim. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. In my view there is no justification for the. The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. The General Assembly located the second district not in the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85. So, too, would be a case in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. 20, 1993, p. A4. U. S. Constitutional Law for a Changing America Resource Center, 13. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. 639-652. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. UJO, supra, at 148. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Then locate the subject of the verb and underline it once. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. 461 (EDNC 1992). They did not even claim to be white. More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. The majority read UJO to stand for the proposition that a redistricting scheme violates white voters' rights only if it is "adopted with the purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters on account of their race." , post, p. 658 should be affirmed from December 9 constitution prohibits using race as the basis for to! S. 347 ; cf joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, J., joined by Brennan,,... Miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than Fourteenth... Appearances do matter Guinn v. United States district Court 's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Amendment..., O. 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